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National Security Gone Too Far: Flaws in the Designation of Tier III Terrorist Organizations 
Newton Portorreal* 
I. Introduction  
The United States has long sought to bar immigrants for their political views.  After the 
assassination of President McKinley in 1901 by Leon Czoglos,1 Congress provided for the 
exclusion of “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence 
of the Government of the United States or of all governments or of all forms of law, or the 
assassination of public officials.”2  After World War I, Congress broadened the exclusionary 
grounds to include the advocacy (or, membership in a group that advocates) of prohibited acts.3  
In 1950, Congress expressly made membership or affiliation with the Communist Party grounds 
for exclusion.4  At the same time, Congress included the broad exclusion ground for immigrants 
seeking entry in order to engage in activities “prejudicial to the public interest.”5  In 1990, Congress 
enacted section 601 of the Immigration Act of 1990, creating exclusion grounds for individuals 
whose entries or activities might adversely affect U.S. foreign policy.6  Today, the terrorism 
exclusion grounds extend to those who are affiliated with terrorist organizations in specific ways, 
and most controversially, to those who provide “material support” to terrorist organizations or 
activity.7   
                                                 
* Newton Portorreal, Jr., J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Tufts University. 
1 John Higham, an American historian, referred to Czoglos as “an anarchist of American birth but obviously of foreign 
extraction.” JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 111 (2002).  
2 Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, sec. 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221.  
3 Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008, 1009. 
4 Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Title I, § 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006. 
5 Id. 
6 Immigration Act of 1990, § 601.  Today, the provision is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(C). 
7 § 1882 (a)(2)(B)(iv)(VI). 
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Viewed in this light, Congress’ current anti-terrorist restrictions on immigration are a 
natural extension in the history of exclusion grounds.  In response to the new threat of foreign 
terrorism, Congress enacted the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996, 
a comprehensive antiterrorism statute.8  After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Congress enacted a variety of additional restrictions in the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), 
expanding the range of terrorism-related exclusion grounds.9  Specifically, the Patriot Act was 
enacted to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world [and] to 
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.”10  Title IV of the Patriot Act, titled “Protect the 
Border,” created enhanced immigration restrictions.11 
Congress lengthened that list of exclusion grounds again through the REAL ID Act of 
2005.12 The REAL ID Act of 2005 in fact modified the material support bar to require a petitioner, 
who did in fact provide material support to a terrorist organization, to show by clear and convincing 
evidence they did not know they were supporting terrorism.13  There is a vast literature regarding 
the material support bar and its broad applicability.14  But material support is only one factor in 
the exclusion equation—a would-be immigrant must give that material support to a terrorist 
organization to fall within the exclusion ground.  Given how broadly material support is defined, 
loosely defining terrorist organizations can have unintended consequences.  
                                                 
8  Pub. L. No. 104-132. 
9  Pub. L. No. 107-56. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Pub. L. No. 109-13. 
13 Id. at § 103(a)(VI). 
14 See, e.g., Teresa Pham Messer, Barred From Justice: The Duress Waiver to the Material Support Bar, 6 HLRE OFF 
THE RECORD 63 (2015) (recommending solutions to the existing unjust applications of the material support bar); 
Steven H. Schulman, Victimized Twice: Asylum Seekers and the Material-Support Bar, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 949 (2010) 
(criticizing the broad application of the material support bar and advising practitioners on how to navigate it); Kara 
Beth Stein, Female Refugees: Re-Victimized by the Material Support to Terrorism Bar, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 815 
(2007) (criticizing DHS’s overly inclusive interpretation of the material support bar for its outsize impact on women 
refugees). 
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The existing statutory definition of a terrorist organization is separated into three tiers.15  
Tier I terrorist organizations are “foreign organizations that pose a threat to the United States by 
‘engaging or retaining the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.’”16  They 
are designated by the State Department, subject to bank account freezes, criminal penalties, and 
immigration sanctions, have their names published in the Federal Register and may seek judicial 
review of their designation.17  Tier II terrorist organizations are “foreign organizations that engage 
in terrorist activity or provide material support to further terrorist activity.”18  They are subject to 
immigration sanctions and have their names published in the State Department’s Terrorist 
Exclusion List (TEL).19  Their designation may either be revoked through an order of Congress or 
based upon a finding that there was a change in circumstances.20  Tier III terrorist organizations, 
the focus of this comment, were also redefined by the REAL ID Act of 2005.21 They are “any 
group ‘whether organized or not, [that has] a subgroup which engages in, terrorist activities.’”22  
They are designated on a case-by-case basis without appearing on any central register.23  
Individuals who are members or supporters of tier III terrorist organizations are subject to 
immigration sanctions only.24   
This Comment will argue that the existing statutory definition of tier III terrorist 
organizations should either be amended by Congress or given a narrow construction by the courts.  
                                                 
15 8 U.S.C. § 1882 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(III) define “terrorist organization” in three ways.  See infra notes 16 to 28 and the 
accompanying text. 
16 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) 
17 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
18 Mary Orsini, Quantity vs. Quality: The Misdirected War on Immigration and the Sweeping Effects of the Tier III 
Terrorist Organization, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 167, 169-170. 
19 Id. at 170. 
20 § 1189(a)(5) and (6). 
21 Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103(a)(vi)(III). 
22 Id. 
23 Mary Orsini, Quantity vs. Quality: The Misdirected War on Immigration and the Sweeping Effects of the Tier III 
Terrorist Organization, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 167, 170–71. 
24 Id. 
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It is both over and under inclusive, inequitably barring the unsuspecting from immigration relief 
while potentially allowing members and supporters of dangerous organizations repeated 
opportunities to litigate their way into immigration relief.  
II. Defining the Tier III Terrorist Organization 
This section will interpret the statutory definition of tier III terrorist organizations, 
beginning with the plain text of the statute.  As per the statute, an individual may be barred from 
admission to the United States for being a member of or providing material support to a terrorist 
organization.25  Tier III terrorist organizations are defined as “a group of two or more individuals, 
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist 
activity].”26 However, two parts of the statute require further elaboration: what “terrorist activity” 
is and what it means to “engage” in terrorist activity.  This section surveys efforts by various courts 
of appeals to limit the literal statutory language by focusing on the definition of “terrorist activity” 
and the requirement that organizations authorize terrorist activity before it is imputed to them. 
 
A. Terrorist Activity 
Section 1182’s definition of terrorist activity is expansive.27  While a number of very 
specific acts qualify as terrorist activities, this section also includes a catch-all clause: “the use of 
any . . . explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals 
or to cause substantial damage to property.”28  On its face, this statute makes: (1) a knife fight at a 
                                                 
25 § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).  This sanction is applicable no matter which tier of terrorist organization the individual is 
accused of joining or otherwise supporting.  
26 § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) 
27 § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii).  
28 Id. 
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bar; (2) an assault with a baseball bat over a perceived insult; and (3) soccer hooliganism where a 
rock is a thrown at opposing fans, terrorist activity.  It is no wonder, then, that the tier III terrorist 
organization designation has been decried as barring immigration relief for association with “two 
guys and a gun.”29  
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to interpret this statute in Budiono.30 In that case, 
Budiono, an Indonesian national, had his petition for withholding of removal rejected by the 
immigration judge (IJ) because: (1) his application was time-barred, (2) Budiono had failed to 
prove past persecution and was ineligible for withholding of removal; and, in the alternative, (3) 
he associated with “Jakarta-based Muslim community group Jemaah Muslim Attaqwa (‘JMA’).”31  
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Budiono’s claim was again rejected.32   
The Ninth Circuit, however, disapproved of the IJ’s disposition on the alternative 
grounds.33  In the proceedings below, the government had introduced evidence that the JMA was 
a radical, militant Islamic group that participated in violent, anti-government riots and may have 
caused at least two deaths and substantial property damage.34  JMA members assaulted Budiono 
and his wife after Budiono protested the group’s militancy and renounced his membership in the 
organization.35  Nonetheless, the Court insisted that the government had failed to make the 
requisite evidentiary showing.36  Specifically, the government failed to make a “threshold showing 
                                                 
29 Maryellen Fullerton, Terrorism, Torture, and Refugee Protection in the United States, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
Vol. 29, No. 4, UNHCR (2011), p. 13. 
30 Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). 
31 Id. at 1044. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 1045. 
36 Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1048. 
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of particularized evidence of the [terrorist] bar’s applicability before placing on the applicant the 
burden to rebut it.”37   
The evidentiary showing required by the Ninth Circuit in Budiono is analogous to another 
immigration law concept: the persecution bar.  The persecutor bar makes individuals ineligible for 
asylum protection when they have “ordered, indicted, assisted, or otherwise participated in” 
persecution of a person on account of a protected ground.38  In those cases, the Government must 
make a sufficient evidentiary showing, as to both the “personal involvement and purposeful 
assistance”39 of persecution by the individual seeking relief to raise the inference that the bar 
applies.40  Only then does a rebuttable presumption in favor of applying the bar exist.41 
Applying that standard to Budiono’s case, the Ninth Circuit found that the Government 
had failed to make the requisite showing.42  Specifically, the Government did not introduce 
evidence that the JMA ever used weapons, as required statutorily.43  Accordingly, the terrorist bar 
did not apply to Budiono and he was, in fact, eligible for immigration relief.44 
The Budiono Court’s statutory construction is a model for other courts to follow in this 
area.  The statute at issue made no explicit mention of a threshold evidentiary showing.45  
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit imposed a requirement that the Government present particularized 
evidence to raise the inference that the terrorist bar applies.46  By denying that such a judicial 
                                                 
37 Id. at 1048. 
38 Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2006).  
39 Id. at 927. 
40 Id. at 930. 
41 See, e.g., id. 
42 Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1050. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1051. 
45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).  The statute merely defines terrorist activities but does not mention the standard of 
proof by which the government must support an allegation that an alien should be subject to the terrorist bar. 
46 Budiono, 937 F.3d at 1049 (“to invoke the terrorist bar, it is not enough for the government simply to assert that an 
individual was involved with a radical political or religious group. Rather, the record evidence must raise the inference 
that each element of the bar applies.”). 
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inference was appropriate for the IJ, the Ninth Circuit imposed a judicial limit on an unwieldy 
statute.   The Ninth Circuit did so by departing from the plain text to interpret terrorist activity for 
the purposes of determining a tier III terrorist organization.    More courts should follow the lead 
of the Ninth Circuit and other Courts of Appeal in imposing judicial limits to prevent inequitable 
applications of the terrorist bar.47 
B. “Engaging” in Terrorist Activity 
Section 118248 classifies as a tier III terrorist organization any “group [or subgroup] of two 
or more individuals” engaged in terrorist activity.49 Although terrorist activity50, defined supra in 
subsection a, is relatively straightforward, courts have focused on the preceding verb: “engage.”  
Take, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hussain v Mukasey.51  In that case, Hussain, 
a green card holder and national of Pakistan, challenged his removal order from the IJ.52  Below, 
the IJ found Hussain was removable for gaining entry into the United States by fraud and for 
engaging in terrorist activity.53  Hussain had previously been convicted of immigration fraud.54  
On appeal, the Government agreed to vacate the judgment.55  The IJ, however, found that Hussain 
gained entry by fraud by concealing his membership in Mohajir Quami Movement-Haqiqi (MQM-
H).56  It does not seem to be disputed that Hussain was a member of MQM-H and concealed his 
membership in order to gain entry and receive permanent resident status. 
                                                 
47 See infra Part V 
48 8 U.S.C. § 1182 
49 § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) 
50 See supra Part II.A. 
51 518 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 535. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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The IJ also found that Hussain was eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT) because Hussain would likely be tortured upon his return to Pakistan.57  The IJ ultimately 
entered an order of removal but stayed its effect until Hussain could be removed without 
precipitating a violation of the CAT.58  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination.59  On appeal to 
the Seventh Circuit, Hussain argued that the definition of a tier III terrorist organization was 
impermissibly vague and created a “serious constitutional issue of fair notice.”60 
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner observed the while the statute was broad, it was not 
vague.61  According to Posner, whatever ambiguity exists in the statute, it exists in the provision 
that requires an organization “engage” in particular activity.62  Judge Posner, however, resolved 
the ambiguity by holding that “engaging” in activity as an organization depends upon authorization 
of a member’s activity by the organization:  “if an activity is not authorized, ratified, or otherwise 
approved or condoned by the organization, then the organization is not the actor.”63  Contrasting 
this theory of organizational activity to the law of agency, Judge Posner reasoned that without 
authorization, an organization is not an actor.64  It may be liable for the actions of an agent, but it 
cannot be said to have “engaged” in that agent’s actions.65  For Judge Posner, however, 
organizations can authorize violence through their silence.  Because MQM-H, specifically, “did 
not criticize, or make efforts to curb . . . violence; an inference that it was authorized is 
                                                 
57 Hussain, 518 F.3d at 535. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 537. 
61 Id. 
62 Hussain, 518 F.3d at 538. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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inescapable.”66  Authorization need not be formal, nor do the acts authorized need to be politically 
motivated.67   
The Third Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Uddin v. Sessions.68  In that case, 
the Third Circuit took an appeal challenging the IJ and BIA’s determination that Uddin, a national 
of Bangladesh, was ineligible for withholding of removal because he was a member of the 
Bangladesh National Party (BNP).69  The BNP is one of Bangladesh’s two major political parties, 
along with the Awami League (AL).70  Uddin alleged he was victim to various incidents of 
violence at the hands of members of the AL.71   
The IJ, however, denied Uddin’s claim for relief because he was a member of the BNP, 
which, in the past, used violence for political purposes.72  During the 2013-14 election cycle, party 
leadership announced a series of strikes and blockades.73  During these strikes, however, members 
of the BNP engaged in various incidents of political violence.74  Accordingly, the IJ, and the BIA, 
which affirmed, deemed that the BNP was a tier III terrorist organization.75  Crucially, however, 
both the IJ and BIA failed to “discuss whether the specified terrorist acts were actually 
authorized.”76  The Court subsequently held that “absent such a finding regarding authorization by 
a group’s leaders, Tier III status cannot be assigned to a group.”77   
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 870 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2017). 
69 Id. at 284. 
70 Id. at 285. 
71 Id. at 286. 
72 Id. at 287. 
73 Uddin, 870 F.3d at 287. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 289. 
76 Id. at 290. 
77 Id. 
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To reach this holding, the Court relied on the statutory text, the BIA’s own rulings, and the 
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit.78  Beginning with the statutory text, the Court noted that groups, 
not merely their members, engage in terrorist activity.79  As in Hussain, the Court acknowledged 
that groups engage in activity by authorizing the actions of its members.80  Further, the Court 
pointed out that the BIA itself had adopted the authorization requirement in cases involving the 
BNP.81  Finally, the Court explicitly endorsed Judge Posner’s analogy to agency law in Hussain.82 
In concurrence, Judge Greenaway made explicit that the authorization requirement 
likewise applies to subgroups.83  Judge Greenaway’s concern was that rogue members of any group 
could, by clever litigators, be defined as a subgroup of the larger group and escape the authorization 
requirement imposed by the Seventh and Third circuits.84  Judge Greenaway would clearly impose 
limitations on which collections of members of a group can be considered a subgroup for the 
purposes of determining tier III terrorist organization status.85  The BIA imposes two limits in 
various cases: (1) subgroups must be significant and (2) subgroups must be “‘subordinate to, or 
affiliated with, [the larger group] and the subgroup is dependent on . . . [the larger group] . . . to 
support or maintain its operations.’”86  Without this limitation, the authorization requirement 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Uddin, 870 F.3d at 290. 
80 Id. (“Had the statute stated that a Tier III terrorist organization is “a group whose members engage in terrorist 
activity,” then a group's Tier III designation could be based on the individual actions of its members, regardless of 
authorization.  But the text speaks to concerted actions of a group, not uncoordinated activities by individual members: 
an organization receives Tier III status only if a group itself engages in terrorist activity.”) 
81 Id.  The decision did not cite any BIA precedential opinion.  Instead, the panel noted that “the rule we announce 
mirrors the Board's own reasoning in the mine-run of its cases involving the BNP's status as a Tier III organization” 
without any citation. 
82 Id. at 290–91. 
83 Uddin, 870 F.3d at 292 (Greenaway, Jr., J., concurring). 
84 Id. at 293. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting BIA opinion, Dec. 16, 2016). 
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would be toothless.87  The constitutional notice question that precipitated Hussain’s authorization 
exception could be raised anew “so long as ‘subgroup’ can mean ‘members.’”88 
The authorization requirement announced by Hussain and refined by Uddin are other 
examples of the courts limiting the application of an extraordinarily broad statute. More courts 
should adopt the particular rule announced in these cases, but more broadly, adopt a willingness 
to narrowly construe tier III terrorist organizations in the spirit of equitable application of our 
immigration law.89 
III. Negative Effects of Tier III Designation’s Broad Reach and Failure to Provide 
Standards 
The facially broad language of the tier III designation is likely to swallow up organizations 
that are neither a national security threat nor terrorist organizations in our ordinary language sense.  
As Judge Posner recognized, “[t]errorism as used in common speech refers to the use of violence 
for political ends.  But the statutory definition of ‘terrorist organization’ is broad enough to 
encompass a pair of kidnappers.”90  This section will lay out examples of various inequitable 
applications of the tier III designation. 
In Khan v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of an Indian national whose 
application for asylum and withholding of removal was denied by the IJ and the BIA because he 
engaged in terrorist activity.91  Khan had been involved in the Kashmiri independence movement 
since 1967 and, sometime in the early 1970s, began working with the Jammu Kashmir Liberation 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 293 n. 2. 
89 See infra Part V.  
90 Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2008).  Judge Posner continues, however, “[t]he statutory 
deformation of the ordinary meaning of the word ‘terrorist’ would be a problem if people were allowed to rely, in 
determining their legal obligations, on the name of a statute without bothering to read the body of the statute. They 
are not.” Id. at 538. 
91 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Front (JKLF).92  The JKLF had both militant and political factions; the militant faction engaged in 
political violence, the political faction engaged in nonviolent advocacy for Kashmir 
independence.93  Khan was involved only with the political wing of the JKLF.94  Nonetheless, 
Khan admitted knowledge of the militant wing’s activities.95  The IJ decided, and the BIA affirmed, 
that Khan was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal on the basis of his affiliation with 
the JKLF.96   
Among other arguments, Khan contended that the JKLF was erroneously designated a 
terrorist organization.97  In short, Khan argued that because the JKLF was engaged in legitimate 
political resistance against the government of India, its actions were only unlawful if they violated 
international law.98  The Ninth Circuit panel rejected Khan’s contention on the basis that it was 
unsupported by either domestic or international law.99 
Turning to the statutory text, the panel noted that the “unlawful” acts that may be deemed 
terrorist activity refer unambiguously to acts deemed “unlawful in the place where they were 
committed.”100  The panel further noted that Khan’s argument was belied by the discretionary 
waiver provision of the terrorism bar.101  Because the executive is granted broad latitude with 
waiver authority, the panel decided that the broad reading of the terrorism bar, without an 
exception for resistance within the bounds of international law, was justified.102 
                                                 
92 Id. at 775. 
93 Id. at 775–76. 
94 Id. at 776. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  The IJ and BIA did hold, however, that Khan was eligible for relief under the CAT. Id. 
97 Khan, 584 F.3d at 778. 
98 Id. at 781. 
99 See id. at 780–84. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 784 (noting that “even if [the definition of terrorist activity and the determination of refugee status] did 
conflict, the administrative discretion in the INA . . . might resolve the conflict.”). 
102 Id. at 782. 
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While the Ninth Circuit’s application of the terrorism bar may well have been correct, there 
is little doubt that the failure to find an exception for legitimate resistance leads to inconsistent 
relief for asylum seekers who sought to defend themselves in their home countries.103  The absurd 
application of the tier III designation is not lost on the courts themselves.  The Third Circuit 
recently noted that a failure to implement the authorization requirement might require the courts 
to consider the Democratic and Republican Parties terrorist organizations.104  It is such application 
that prevents members of pro-democratic groups abroad from seeking admission in the United 
States.105 
Just as troubling, however, is that the tier III designation is determined on a case-by-case 
basis.106  This means that the same organization can be a terrorist organization in one case and not 
in another.  Consider the BNP, as the Third Circuit did in Uddin.107  The panel’s own research 
unearthed various opinions by the BIA regarding the BNP.108  The results, to put it mildly, were 
all over the map. 
 In six of the opinions, the Board agreed with the IJ that the BNP qualified as a 
terrorist organization based on the record in that case. But in at least ten, the Board 
concluded that the BNP was not a terrorist organization. In at least five cases, the 
Government did not challenge the IJ's determination that the BNP is not a terrorist 
organization. And in one case, the Board reversed its own prior determination, 
finding that that "the Board's last decision incorrectly affirmed the Immigration 
Judge's finding that the BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization." Many of the cases 
discussed the BNP's terrorist status during the same time periods, reaching radically 
different results.109 
                                                 
103 See Daniella Pozzo Darnell, Comment: The Scarlett Letter “T”: The Tier III Terrorist Classification’s Inconsistent 
and Ineffectual Effects on Asylum Relief for Members and Supporters of Pro-democratic Groups, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 
557 (2012).  
104 See Uddin v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d. Cir. 2017). 
105 See Darnell, supra, note 103 at 557 (relaying the story of Sara, a peaceful political activist in Cameroon whose 
organization, seeking the independence of English-speaking Cameroon, was determined to be a tier III terrorist 
organization, delaying resolution of her petition to bring her children to the United States.). 
106 Uddin, 870 F.3d at 285. 
107 Uddin, 870 F.3d 282. 
108 Id. at 291. 
109 Id. 
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The BIA’s decisions in other cases need not be released to the public, compounding the confusion 
for advocates, asylum seekers, and even IJs.110 
Imagine, however, that the BNP is, in fact, an organization that poses a national security 
risk to the United States.  Surely, there are organizations, dangerous to the United States, whose 
existence escapes the eyes of our State Department.  In fact, this is exactly the scenario the tier III 
designation contemplates: an organization—not designated by the State Department or Secretary 
of State—that nonetheless poses a risk to national security.  If Congress seeks to address the 
problem of dangerous organizations not yet known to our security apparatus, the benefits of case-
by-case designation of such organizations are not apparent.  This flaw cries out for reform as much 
as an inequitable result in any individual case.  A BIA designation that a group is a terrorist 
organization deserves some deference.  Given the government’s very low burden of proof, such 
deference is arguably inappropriate at the moment.  But should the Courts of Appeal or Congress 
implement some of the limits argued for infra, the BIA’s substantive conclusion that a group is a 
terrorist organization may warrant creating precedential authority. 
IV. The Material Support Bar and its Interplay with the Tier III Designation 
Though the material support bar does not only apply to supporters of tier III terrorist 
organizations, its broad applicability, combined with the facially broad definition of tier III terrorist 
organizations, can result in facially inequitable results.  Accordingly, understanding the material 
support bar is key to understanding the concrete impact of flaws with the tier III designation.  This 
                                                 
110 See Heartland Alliance Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr. v. DHS, 840 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Freedom 
of Information Act does not compel the government to turn over the names of tier III terrorist organizations).  
16 
 
section will elaborate on the content of the material support bar and summarize existing criticism 
of the bar, especially in relation to its application to tier III terrorist organizations. 
A. Defining the Material Support Bar 
In re S-K- provides an informative application of the material support bar after its revision 
by the REAL ID Act of 2005.111  In that case, respondent, a Burmese national, Christian and ethnic 
Chin, faced persecution if returned to Burma, then under the control of an autocratic, military 
regime.112  During her time in Burma, respondent donated money to the Chin National Front 
(CNF), an organization dedicated to the freedom of ethnic Chin people.113  There was some 
question as to whether, given the Burmese government’s relationship to the United States, the CNF 
was in fact a terrorist organization.114  Nonetheless, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that the 
CNF was a terrorist organization because it used force against and was outlawed by the Burmese 
government.115 
Among other things, respondent argued her support of the CNF failed to qualify as 
material.116  Specifically, she argued the IJ needed to find that the funds and goods she provided 
were “relevant to the planning or implementation of a terrorist act[.]”117  The BIA, however, 
rejected respondent’s contention relying on the statutory text: “[the statute] requires only that the 
provider afford material support to a terrorist organization.”118  It regarded such a limitation as 
unworkable “where assistance as fungible as money is concerned” because even funding for an 
ostensibly benign purpose allows the terrorist organization to use other funds in support of its 
                                                 
111 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. 936 (BIA 2006). 
112 Id. at 937-939. 
113 Id. at 936. 
114 Id. at 940. 
115 Id. at 941. 
116 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. 936, 942 (BIA 2006). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 943. 
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terrorist activities.119  Ultimately, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that respondent was ineligible 
for asylum or withholding of removal owing to her material support of a terrorist organization.120 
While the wisdom of the BIA’s decision may be in dispute,121 its precedential value is not.  
In Hussain, Judge Posner rejected Hussain’s arguments that his fundraising did not contribute to 
MQM-H’s terrorist activities, explicitly relying on In re S-K-’s reasoning.122 
In Annachamy v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit rejected various arguments for exceptions to 
the statutory language of the material support bar.123  Annachamy, a Sri Lankan national, appealed 
the BIA’s decision to bar him from immigration relief for his material support of a terrorist 
organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).124  LTTE was, during Annachamy’s 
residence in Sri Lanka, a militant organization at war with Sri Lanka’s government.125  At various 
times, Annachamy was detained, interrogated, and tortured by the Sri Lankan military.126  
Nevertheless, Annachamy testified that he in fact opposed LTTE as they too attempted to coerce 
him.127  Against his will, LTE forced Annachamy to give money to the organization and cook, dig 
trenches, and build fences at a camp.128  Annachamy fled Sri Lanka and came to the United 
States.129 
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service, now the Department of Homeland Security, 
initiated removal proceedings upon Annachamy’s arrival.130  Annachamy made claims for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.131  The IJ, finding Annachamy’s testimony 
credible, granted Annachamy asylum and withholding of removal.132  The BIA, however, reversed 
the IJ’s opinion on the grounds that Annachamy had provided material support to a terrorist 
organization.133  On appeal, Annachamy argued that: (1) LTTE was an organization engaged in 
legitimate political violence and (2) he provided support under duress.134 
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the BIA and rejected the contention that the 
material support bar contained an exception either for legitimate political violence or support 
provided under duress.135  On the first argument, the Court relied on the plain text of the material 
support bar to undermine Annachamy’s contention that an exception existed for support of a 
legitimate resistance group.136  The fatal blow to Annachamy’s argument was the concession that 
LTTE was a terrorist organization.137  Because the Ninth Circuit did not find a political offense 
exception in the definition of terrorist activity, it similarly declined to locate a political offense 
exception in the definition of material support.138 
Moving onto Annachamy’s second argument, the Ninth Circuit panel relied on textual and 
structural factors in denying that a duress exception existed in the definition of material support.139  
While the material support bar did not provide an explicit exception under duress, a neighboring 
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subsection does, indeed, contain such an exception.140  The panel concluded that the failure to 
explicitly create an exception to the material support bar, however, is evidence Congress did not 
intend to create such an exception.141  Further, the material support bar’s administrative waiver 
provision indicated that Congress left to the executive branch the discretion to consider whether 
certain individuals were forced to support terrorist organizations against their will, or that 
particular terrorist organizations had a practice of forced support.142  In short, because the evidence 
weighed against finding that Congress intended a duress exception to the material support bar, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that such an exception exists.143 
B. Application of the Material Support Bar 
Much of the criticism around the material support bar focuses on its application to 
individuals otherwise deserving of relief.144  Its effects do not neatly map onto the presumptive 
goals of Congress in its enactment: keeping the United States safe from foreign terrorism.  It differs 
in meaningful ways from similar immigration law provisions.145  One commentator compares the 
language and development of the persecutor bar, established by the Refugee Act of 1980,146 to the 
material support bar.147  The material support bar and the persecutor bar both affect primarily the 
same provisions of asylum law—allowing the United States to turn away refugees.  While the 
persecutor bar brings the United States into compliance with the United Nations Refugee 
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Convention and Protocol148, the Refugee Act also allows the United States to deny entry to 
refugees who pose a risk to national security.149  However, neither statutory provision contains an 
explicit duress exception in its statutory text.150  
Quite apart from the facial similarities these provisions share, the courts have given each 
quite different treatment.  For one, courts have held that the persecutor bar requires that the 
government establish much more conclusively a person’s direct involvement in the alleged 
persecution.151  The courts have held that the material support bar, on the other hand, is satisfied 
when the government shows even a tenuous connection to a terrorist organization and need not 
make any connection at all to terrorist activity.152  The government’s burden is also lower when it 
needs to establish the individual’s state of mind in providing material support.153 
The most important difference between the treatment of these two statutes, however, has 
been the application of a duress exception to the persecutor bar but no such exception to the 
material support bar.  In Negusie, the Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of 
a BIA decision to apply the persecutor bar to a dual national of Eritrea and Ethiopia who was jailed 
and forced to work as a prison guard by the Eritrean government.154  Below, the BIA had denied 
Negusie’s application for relief by applying a categorical rule it had developed in its own case 
law155 and, in the Court’s eyes, failed to “exercise[] its interpretative authority.”156  Although the 
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Court did not answer the question,157 in requiring the BIA to interpret the applicability of the 
persecutor bar in the first instance, the Supreme Court created some grounds for arguing that there 
was such an exception, not just for the persecutor bar but for the material support bar.158  Alas, 
however, various courts of appeals have since upheld the BIA’s determination that there is no 
duress exception to the material support bar.159 
Interpreting the material support bar to not include a duress exception forces individuals 
who were forced to provide support to terrorist organization in their home countries to rely on an 
imperfect administrative waiver process.160  
V. Proposals for Reform of the Tier III Designation 
This section will offer some possible reforms to the scheme of tier III designation.  First, 
this section will detail legislative reform efforts either attempted by the legislature or 
recommended to the legislature by commentators or courts.  Then, this section will offer some 
proposals for limited statutory interpretation and justifications of existing limits on this statute. 
A. Legislative Changes 
There are a number of policy reasons to change the way we define terrorist organizations: 
we ensnare immigrants we do not want to bar from relief, we strengthen anti-American resentment 
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abroad, and we fail in our international treaty obligations. These, however, are not reasons for the 
courts to interpret the statute a particular way (or at least, not the only reasons). These are the 
reasons Congress should do something about the law. 
One such proposal is “the eradication of the Tier III terrorist organization given its 
imprecision in targeting threats to the United States.”161  The tier III designation has done little 
except “waste[] copious amounts of time and resources by investigating individuals that pose no 
threat to the United States. Time and resources better spent enforcing laws denying relief to 
individuals that actually pose a threat to the United States.”162   
Congress has, in fact, considered such a solution.  Senators Patrick Leahy163 and Carl 
Levin164 introduced the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 to no avail.165  That bill proposed 
eliminating the tier III designation entirely, in a section entitled “Protecting Victims of Terrorism 
from Being Defined as Terrorists.”166  In proposing the bill, Senator Leahy cited the need to 
recommit to and re-comply with America’s obligations under 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol.167  Unfortunately, Senators Leahy and Levin’s bill did 
not become law.  Today, Congress seems to have rejected the vision of limiting the exclusion 
grounds and instead expanding them.  Take, for instance, a bill introduced by Senator Chuck 
Grassley in the 115th Congress.168  The bill’s purpose is to make “aliens associated with a criminal 
gang inadmissible, deportable, and ineligible for various forms of relief.”169  While Senator 
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Grassley’s bill has not seen any movement since its introduction, it does indicate two things.  First, 
Congress is looking to expand, not contract, the exclusion grounds.  Second, it may signal that the 
next perceived threat to national security Congress will seek to address is the threat of street gangs 
composed primarily of immigrant members.170   
Another suggestion, less radical than the outright repeal of the tier III designation proposed 
by Senators Leahy and Levin is for Congress to increase the government’s burden of proof, ever 
so slightly, in the removal proceedings.  If Congress’ goal is to preclude real dangers to national 
security from immigration relief, it should take those goals seriously.  It should require the 
government show that an individual has some likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity.171  
Outside of the terrorism bar, such a showing is required by the government.  In the Communism 
bar, for instance, a former member or affiliate of the Communist Party may avoid application of 
the bar if she can prove that her “membership or affiliation terminated . . . at least 2 years before 
the date of such application . . . and the alien is not a threat to the security of the United States.”172  
As one commentator points out, the framework for such a requirement already exists in the 
terrorist activities section providing for security grounds of admissibility.173  One of the nine 
enumerated grounds is that “[a]ny alien who . . . the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or likely to engage after entry 
in any terrorist activity.”174  If, instead, the government were required to show an individual was 
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engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist activity, then required to show one of the remaining eight 
enumerated grounds, much of the tier III designation’s inequitable application could be 
resolved.175  Such a requirement would operate like the two-step process barring those associated 
with terrorist organizations from immigration relief.176  Such a change would also bring some 
necessary consistency to the terrorism bar.   
Another proposal for reform offered is to redefine terrorist activity so that it must be 
unlawful under the laws of the United States and not the laws of the place the activity is 
committed.177  Such a requirement would also alleviate inequitable application of the terrorism bar 
in cases like In re S-K-.178  While S-K- is the touchstone in material support analysis, its holding 
relied on finding that the CNF was a terrorist organization.179  That determination rested solely 
upon the fact that its activities were considered unlawful by the Burmese government.180  While 
the result in S-K- prompted both executive and congressional redress,181 it might have been avoided 
by simply requiring the government to show that CNF’s activities would have been illegal in the 
United States.  If an organization’s actions would not have violated domestic law had they taken 
place in the United States, then there is no basis for determining they are a national security risk.  
More importantly, limiting the bar to would-be violations of domestic law allows the immigration 
of members and supporters of pro-democratic groups under repressive, undemocratic regimes. 
A third proposal for reform, from another commentator, is redrafting the tier III designation 
to reflect a multi-factored approach geared towards excluding militant groups that are more 
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squarely at odds with both domestic law and international norms.182  The first factor is whether the 
organization’s purpose is political and if so, how central are its political goals to its purpose.183  Of 
note is the relation between the group’s objectionable activities and its political purpose.184  A 
second factor is the willingness of the group to strategically exploit the fear of noncombatants.185  
This would allow for the immigration of members of groups who engage in self-defense while 
targeting those objectionable few who target the innocent.186  Finally, the courts should be required 
to consider whether the group engages in internationally proscribed acts of violence.187  The third 
factor, again, would allow the self-defensive use of arms and non-violent political dissent.188  On 
the whole, the benefit of the multifactor approach would be to alleviate the inconsistent 
classification of terrorist organizations.189 
In the likely event that Congress fails to implement any statutory reform, there are 
nonetheless avenues for the court to implement the narrow, limiting applications of the tier III 
designation discussed in part II, supra, through the tools of statutory interpretation. 
First, more courts should consider implementing the threshold evidentiary showing of 
Budiono.190  For one, it is “unreasonable to expect applicants for withholding of removal and other 
forms of relief to anticipate what bars might apply to their case, and then to affirmatively rebut all 
of those bars.”191  When the terrorism bar is so broad, it might prove near impossible to anticipate 
that the glass of water given to a stranger was material support for a terrorist organization.  
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Underneath this concern, however, is the fear that meritorious claims for immigration relief are 
being denied “on the basis of a vague association with religious or political fundamentalism.”192   
The authorization requirement announced by Hussain193 and Uddin194 should also be 
adopted by the courts.  The Third Circuit argues that such a requirement “simply formalizes 
common sense notions as to what a terrorist organization is.”195  Of course, violence at a rally for 
President Trump would not make the Republican Party a terrorist organization.  It would defy 
common sense to impute to the larger organization, the Party, actions of rogue members that it did 
not authorize, endorse, or even condone.  In fact, because we would expect such action to draw 
the Party’s condemnation, it seems especially inappropriate to hold the Party responsible in any 
way.  Likewise, the courts should deny that the government can merely raise evidence that 
members of a group were engaged in terrorist activity and must instead show authorization for 
terrorist activities by group leadership. 
A necessary corollary of that rule must be a concurrent limitation of the definition of 
subgroup.196  As wise as the adoption of the authorization requirement may be, if it may be escaped 
by clever litigators, then it is toothless.  Requiring that “subgroups” be more than “whichever 
individuals committed terrorist acts”197 does not have much force on its own, but it does close the 
inevitable loophole created by a focus on group authorization of member activities. 
VI. Conclusion 
Congress’ immigration scheme has long barred individuals from relief for their political 
affiliations.  From “anarchists” in the post-war period, to Communists in the cold-war period, to 
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terrorists as the War on Terror reaches every corner of the globe.  Now, as then, Congress is 
primarily concerned with national security.  Nonetheless, both Congress and the courts can 
effectively address the gaping flaws of the existing terrorism bar by reigning in the application of 
the tier III designation.  Congress may impose a higher burden of proof upon the government, take 
a multifactored approach to the designation of a tier III terrorist organization, or eliminate the tier 
III designation altogether.  Courts, on the other hand, may adopt the threshold evidentiary showing 
of Budiono and the authorization requirement of Hussain and Uddin.  The status quo is the worst 
of the available options. 
